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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the various episodes in the Malaysian auditing
saga, covering the period of the first 40 years post-independence in 1957 to just before the onset of the
Asian Financial Crisis in 1997.
Design/methodology/approach – Based on documentary analysis, the paper offers a historical
account of the development of the auditing profession with reference to the dynamic changes in its
political and socio-economic environment.
Findings – The paper concludes that the function of auditing in Malaysian society responded to
political-economic pressures over time viz. changing from maintaining the economic policy to serve
Western investors to accommodating ethnic relations, and to strengthening the bond between local
and global corporate elites and the political leaders.
Originality/value – Since, little is known of the professionalisation process in Malaysia, our
analysis of the structural conditions during the 40 years from the achievement of independence from
the British in 1957 to just before the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and our assessment of
their implications for auditing contributes to knowledge in this area.
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1. Introduction
The existence and development of the profession and the role and status of auditing in a
country is dependent on the socio-economic and political conditions, the influence of the
capitalist system and its impact on social reproduction (Tinker, 1984; Perera and Mathews,
1990). Those conditions are not static and the changes are often brought about by various
building blocks of society disguised as groups, classes, institutions and associations. Over
time, these changes impact the function of auditing in meeting both local and global
demands for its services. In developed Anglo-Saxon capitalist economies, the role of
auditing is deemed significant, as the process of wealth creation and political stability
depends heavily upon confidence in processes of accountability and how well the expected
roles are being fulfilled (Sikka et al., 1998). As such, the courts, regulatory agencies and
various stakeholder groups have played their part in demanding that the profession move
in an expeditious fashion to meet its responsibilities as perceived by the public (Flint, 1983;
Bruce, 1988; Humphrey et al., 1992; Jacob, 1992).
However, in developing countries, the advancement of the profession and its role
may not necessarily serve the public’s best interest but the interest of those with power
in society, supported by the ruling party. The social differences in level of sovereignty
(in the case of former colonies), the dynamics of social change and the type of ruling
class, as well as economic changes and growth, have direct effects on the development
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of the accounting profession in such societies. Previous studies have shown how
internal and external forces impact on the professionalisation process in some former
British colonies (Uche, 2002; Annisette, 1999; Bakre, 2005). Since, little is known of the
professionalisation process in Malaysia, our analysis of the structural conditions
during the 40 years from the achievement of independence from the British in 1957 to
just before the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and our assessment of their
implications for auditing contributes to knowledge in this area.
Based on available documentary evidence, this paper offers a historical account of
the development of the profession and its role within the dynamics of the wider
socio-political and economic context. Our analysis is divided into three episodes
denoting three different time frames in the auditing saga. Figure 1 presents an
overview of our analysis of the three episodes in the Malaysian auditing saga.
To discuss our analysis, the paper is organised in sections. Sections 2-4 present our
analysis based on three episodes: the newly independent nation pre-National Economic
Policy (NEP) (1957-1968); the racial tension and the implementation of the NEP
(1969-1985); and post-NEP until the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis (1986-1997).
Each section concerning the episodes begins with a description of the socio-political
and economic environment, followed by a description of the important events in the
development of the profession and the state of auditing in each era. Section 5 provides a
summary and conclusions.
2. Episode 1: newly independent nation (pre-NEP)
Some form of external auditing was practiced long before independence[1] in the then
Straits Settlements as a result of significant British investments in rubber estates and
tin mines (Allen and Donnithorne, 1954). Due to separation of ownership and
management[2], auditing was a necessity and to serve the purpose, the audit firm of
McAuliffe, Davis & Hope was established in Penang in 1909 (Liang, 1989) and
branches and/or affiliated societies were formed by the English Institute of Chartered
Accountants in the Straits Settlements in 1910 (Johnson and Caygill, 1971). In 1957, the
Malay Federation gained its independence from Britain. One of the negotiations in
the transfer of power between the British and the nation’s political leaders from the
Malay, Chinese and Indian communities (Vreeland et al., 1976) was the continuance of
an economic policy of free enterprise, which meant the non-nationalisation of
British-owned companies (Limlingan, 1994). Table I presents the corporate ownership
structure before and in the early years post-independence.
The table shows the domination of foreigners in the rubber and tin mining sectors of
the economy in the period pre-independence and which continued even after 15 years
of independence. Similarly, they also dominated the manufacturing sector. Such a
scenario has important implications on the professionalisation process and the
function of auditing, as discussed next.
2.1 Audit in the pre-NEP era: the zealous period
The audit arena in the early years post-independence was marked by three significant
developments: the setting up of the Malaysian Association of Certified Public
Accountants (MACPA), the passing of the Companies Act 1965 with sections on
accounts and audit, and the setting up of the Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA)











MACPA was set up in 1958 through the initiative of the private sector[3] with the
objective of advancing the status and development of the accounting profession in
Malaysia and to provide the opportunity to those aspiring to qualify as an accountant
to be trained under local law and practice (The Malaysian Accountant, 1988). It was
modelled upon the Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales
(ICAEW)[4], particularly in terms of professional education, standards and discipline
(The Malaysian Accountant, 1981). The training of accountants under local law and
practice following independence was particularly crucial to the foreign-controlled
corporate sector since non-citizens, i.e. British accountants, were no longer able to
practice as auditors in the country. Hence, the setting up of MACPA may be perceived
as providing the former colonial power with continued access to the accounting market
and with continuing influence over the process.
The passing of the Companies Act 1965, which was drawn mainly from the Victoria
Companies Act of 1961 and the British Companies Act 1948 (Walton, 1986), stressed
the need for the auditor to be independent and to be given broad powers to inspect
records and to obtain information for audit, as well as to have the right to attend
and address the general meetings of the company, but it was silent on the academic
and professional qualifications of the auditor. However, section 8 of the Companies Act
requires those wishing to become a company auditor to apply for a licence from the
finance minister, and to obtain such a licence, the person must be a Malaysian resident
of good character and with the competence to perform such duties.
Year Period Type of business Management
1953 Pre-Independence 700 European-owned
estates
Managed by twenty managing agencies, of which
eleven were merchant houses. Twenty-five
persons, some of whom were directors of
merchant houses, sat on the boards of directors of
nearly 200 rubber companies which owned
nearly a million acres of rubber plantations
1954 108 tin mining Managed predominantly by three managing
agencies: Anglo-Oriental (40), Neill and Bell (14),
Osborne and Chappel (10)
1955 Import/export 60 per cent imports and between 65-75 per cent
by British trading firms
1957 Independence Rubber estates 65 per cent managed by agency houses
1959 Post Independence
Before NEP
Manufacturing The top 156 companies accounted for more than
half of all sales and employed about a third of the
sector’s labour force. Foreigners – those with
residences overseas – owned half the share
capital in the top 83 companies
1965 Tin mining Three mining agencies viz. Anglo-Oriental (11),
Osborne and Chappel (10) and Associated Mines
(4) controlled the operations of 25 of the 43
public-limited tin-mining companies (58 per cent)
1968 Manufacturing Foreigners held 77.1 per cent of shares in pioneer
firms











The passing of the Accountants Act 1967, which resembles the Singapore Society of
Accountants Ordinance 1963[5], marked the emergence of the MIA as the nation’s
statutory body. Its functions include regulating the practice and promoting the
interests of the profession, determining the qualifications of persons for admission as
members, and maintaining the register of accountants who come under one of three
categories of membership: public, registered and licensed accountants. The first two
categories of membership are for those with five years relevant experience in public
accounting firms and who have an accounting degree or post-graduate diploma from
local higher institutions or accounting professional qualifications from the MIA’s
recognised local (i.e. MACPA) and overseas accounting bodies (i.e. the Chartered
Institutes of Scotland, England and Wales, Ireland, Australia, Canada, and India;
the Societies of Accountants of Australia and New Zealand; the Association of
Certified Accountants (UK); the Institute of Cost and Management Accountants (UK)).
Licensed accountants are those who do not have MIA-recognised accounting
qualifications but are allowed to practice for either one of the following two reasons:
they were already in operation as accountants, tax-consultants or tax advisers prior to
the passing of the Accountants Act in 1967; or the finance minister has granted them
limited approval to act as a company auditor under Section 8(6) of the Companies
Act 1965.
In short, auditing developments that took place during this period mirroring those
overseas were to fulfil the need of foreign investors and to ensure that foreign
investments remained. Excessive tax exemptions were also provided to foreign
investors by the government in its quest to attract investment, especially in the
manufacturing sector. In fact, the Parliamentary Debates (1965) clearly documented
that the Companies Act 1965 had two objectives: to protect investors and to attract
“foreign investors” into the country. Specifically, it was in the interest of foreigners,
who were shareholders and bankers to the merchant agency houses, that the right
audit infrastructure needed to be in place. This episode of the Malaysian auditing saga
is succinctly described by Jomo (1986, p. 247): “In the early years after independence,
the post-colonial state continued to serve the interests of British capital in particular,
and foreign capital in general.” In other words, more than a decade after so-called
independence, Malaysia was only independent in form but not in substance: from an
economic point of view, it was still shackled to Britain.
3. Episode 2: racial tension and the implementation of the NEP
For years, underlying tensions have existed between the Malays and the Chinese.
In May 1969, the tensions boiled over into racial violence between the two ethnic
groups due to the economic dominance of the Chinese amidst the poverty of the Malays
(Jayasankaran and Hiebert, 1997). The racial riots made various parties realise that for
the long-term good of the country, there needed to be changes in the nation’s
socio-economic and political structures.
The major transformation in the socio-economic structure in this era was the
introduction of the NEP, an affirmative action plan in 1971. The NEP contained two
prongs, namely, to eradicate poverty “irrespective of race” and to restructure
Malaysian society to reduce and eventually eliminate the identification of race with
economic function (Jomo, 1986). At the time it was introduced, the government




would manage and own at least 30 per cent of the total commercial and industrial
assets in all categories and scales of operation and thus become partners in all aspects
of the economic life of the nation (Selvaratnam, 1974). On the other hand, the
non-Malays and foreigners were expected to own 40 and 30 per cent, respectively, by
1990 (Jesudason, 1989)[6]. As a result, the NEP brought an enormous shift from a
pattern of European-Chinese to Chinese-Malay capital and also from private ownership
to ownership by state and quasi-public bodies (Sieh, 1982). This ended the earlier
laissez fair approach in favour of an active industrialisation policy with a strong state
role and numerical quotas to ensure increased equity ownership and employment for
the Malays (Bowie, 1988). In fact, within a period of seven years after the launch of the
NEP, the state had taken ownership and control of almost all of the large plantations:
Sime Darby, Guthries, Boustead, Highlands and Lowlands, Barlow, and Harrisons and
Crossfield (Hui, 1988; Saruwatari, 1991). By 1976, the state had a 40 per cent stake in
each of the three largest domestic banks, namely Bank Bumiputra, Malayan Banking
and United Malayan Banking Corporation (Peng, 1983), and by 1980, it owned
77.4 per cent of the local banking industry and 50 per cent of the total banking industry
(Hui, 1988). Thus, the government basically had direct control over much institutional
credit and this in turn signified its influence not just over its enterprises but also over
the rest of the business community.
During this period, in an attempt to compete with government-dominated
businesses, Chinese small and medium enterprises (SMEs) backed by the main Chinese
political party, began to evolve from sole proprietorships and partnerships to
corporations (Wai, 1982; Hara, 1991). One major controversial development that was
perceived as radical and challenged by the non-Malay community was the passage of
the Industrial Coordination Act (ICA) 1975. It was seen as a “whip” for the Chinese
companies that had largely ignored the government’s demands in the preceding five
years, that they abandon their closely held family ownership structures and instead
offer public shares to non-Chinese Malaysians (Haniffa, 1999). The passage of the ICA
had seen both domestic (Chinese) and foreign investments declining precipitously from
72 per cent (1971-1975) to only 40 per cent (1976-1980) (Bowie, 1988).
The end of the world commodity boom in 1980 and increased world competition
forced the government to launch the Heavy Industries Policy in 1981, which
de-emphasised export-oriented industries in favour of second stage import-substituting
industries (i.e. capital-intensive plants producing primarily for the local market). The
NEP still remained a central tenet with the launch of this industrial policy and
government efforts at promoting Malay participation in the industrial sector were
further strengthened in three ways: raising the tariffs, as an attempt to encourage
import-substituting industrialisation; establishing free trade zones with generous
incentives to foreign investors, in the hope of inducing trans-national corporations to
invest and also as a means of offsetting the influence of Chinese business; and the setting
up of government enterprises, nominally to be held in trust for the entire Malay
community (Ravenhill, 1995).
However, the recession that took place in 1985-1986 caused the government to
intensify its efforts to attract foreign investors. The restructuring prongs of the NEP
were de-emphasised. This led to a more liberal treatment of private enterprise,
especially direct foreign investment, a softening stance towards restructuring the





manufacturing companies so that they escaped the net of the ICA 1975 (Zainal-Aznam,
1994). Thus, the NEP had, in practice, come to an end around this time, and not in 1990,
as originally planned.
In short, the period from 1971 until mid-1985 may be described as the period of the
expansion of the role of bureaucracy, resulting from both increased government
supervision of the economy and co-option of individual bureaucrats onto the boards of
major private companies. The strategies to enhance the Malay bourgeoisie[7]
(capital-owning class) seemed successful and “Malaysian Incorporation”[8] has seen a
number of more substantial businesses emerging under the auspices of the NEP, usually
run either by politicians or those with close political connections. The resulting overlap
of politics and business led to accusations of conflict of interest and favouritism. Most
corporations, because of their political association, enjoy advantages in procuring
government contracts and production licences (Bowie, 1988). The NEP has also
accentuated class differences within the Malay community, as business went to a
narrow band of the already wealthy and the politically connected Malays (Sieh, 1982).
The strong presence of the government and the increasing involvement of local
Chinese in the corporate sector signified that these corporations were owned, managed
and funded by people from their own respective Malay and Chinese communities who
shared goals that were not only economic but also social and political. Although these
enterprises were registered as companies, in reality, they were unlike the Western
sense of the word “company” as there were conflicting interests among various parties.
There was thus little need for high quality audit, auditor independence or a strong
professional-cum-regulatory body during this period.
3.1 Audit in the NEP era (15 years): the sedated period
The audit arena from the launch of the NEP to the mid-1980s may be described as the
“sedated” period with a number of negative repercussions. Nothing substantial
actually took place, except for the passing of the Accountants’ Rules in 1972, which
were, however, not enforced due to the non-existence of the statutory investigative and
disciplinary committees[9], and the amendments to the Companies Act 1965.
The MIA, as the accounting statutory body, was in a latent state for two decades
because it felt that it should limit its role only to registering accountants in the country
(Business Times, 1987). Unfortunately, it did not even manage to execute that chosen
function successfully, with MACPA taking over this responsibility in 1982. The failure
of the MIA to fulfil its policing role during this period resulted in the proliferation of
unqualified accountants. Self styled accountants holding either unrecognised
qualifications, part qualifications or no qualifications, appeared and grew in number
during the economic expansion of the 1970s and early 1980s[10]. These unqualified
accountants, acting as auditors, would collaborate with the qualified auditors in the
sense that the latter would be paid a token fee (normally a 30 per cent cut) for certifying
and endorsing financial statements that had presumably been audited earlier by the
unqualified auditors (NST, 1988c)[11]. In confronting the issue of unregistered
accountants, MACPA reported that it sent a memorandum to the Accountant-General
of persons identified as violating the provisions of the Accountants Act 1967, but
nothing was done (MACPA, 1981, 1982, 1984). The lack of response is not surprising
since these accountants were needed in the then fast-growing economy, which was




While the government-backed MIA remained dormant, the privately organised
MACPA was left free by the government to do what it felt was right with hardly
any interference or expectation from the government. The MACPA represented
only a fraction of the Malaysian accountant population and was controlled by the
internationally affiliated audit firms, whose clients included foreign investors.
Unfortunately, MACPA had conducted many of its affairs on financial reporting
and accounting professionalisation in a manner that alienated others, planting
seeds for much uneasiness in the late 1980s and 1990s with a revived MIA.
The substantial revision of the Companies Act 1965 undertaken in 1985 was one of
the Government programmes intended to facilitate privatisation and attract foreign
investors following the recession. The amendments incorporated those elements that
were regarded as best accounting standards and practices, leading to a much higher
level of disclosure and accountability to minority shareholders, including foreigners.
The 1985 amendment increases the range of persons excluded from acting as auditors
in an attempt to deter company secretaries from operating as auditors (Phenix, 1986).
It requires for the first time all public accounting firms and the individual partners of
such firms to register with the Registrar of Companies (ROC) and to report to it any
breach or non-observance of any provisions of the Act. However, auditors were
apprehensive with the additional reporting responsibility, claiming that such legal
interference in the auditor-client relationship may impair the perception of the auditors’
independence (Hanafiah, 1990). Not surprisingly, not many cases were reported, and
auditors who failed to abide with the reporting duty to an external party were not
taken to task by the authorities through criminal charges of fraud or conspiracy.
Hence, the audit transformation might be safely said to be superficial and below
expectations, both in terms of the actions of the MIA in the regulatory field and the
implementation of the auditors’ reporting duty under the amended Companies Act.
And yet there did not seem to be any decisive efforts on the part of those with power to
see that these processes were improved.
To summarise, during this era, financial reporting and the related matter of external
auditing was largely superfluous in a business environment where the government, as
the main engine of the economy, was not just the regulator but also the so-called user
and preparer of audited statements. The direct and indirect access to internal financial
information and to the corporations’ directors subverted any strong demand for a truly
functional audit and related matters[12]. The authorities might also have failed to
improve upon the audit functioning as they did not want the accounting practitioners
to make their life unnecessarily difficult, given the “underhand” acts that they may
have committed (or had to commit) to ensure that the goals of the NEP were fulfilled, as
mentioned by Chandra (1989, p. 99):
“To expose their misdemeanours would be to expose the New Economic Policy’s not so subtly
concealed agenda of creating Malay capitalists, whatever the costs and the consequences.
Ethics have to be set aside for the time being – so it has been argued in certain official
circles – to facilitate the rapid growth of a Malay capitalist class.”
4. Episode 3: Post-NEP and the Asian financial crisis
The 1969 tragedy and the subsequent implementation of the NEP pushed the





However, the two economic recessions (1981 followed by 1985-1986) and the financial
debacles of numerous companies, including those owned by the government, in the
first six years of the 1980s, forced the government to turn to the private sector to take
over its role as the engine of the nation’s economy.
The government launched the Promotion of Investments Act 1986 (PIA) and an
Industrial Master Plan (1986-1995) [IMP] to kick-start the economy by scrapping parts
of the NEP that restricted foreign investment (Jayasankaran and Hiebert, 1998) and the
much-loathed provisions of the ICA 1977. The buoyant economy in the early 1990s and
the government’s incentives for foreign investment attracted foreign investors, which
in turn helped to boost the country’s capital market. The total number of companies
listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) [now, Bursa Malaysia] increased
from 285 companies in 1990 to 529 companies by the end of 1995, an overall increase of
about 85 per cent (KLSE, 1996). More than two-thirds of the 335 companies on the main
board and all of the 92 companies on the second board were controlled either by one or
a few shareholders holding more than 51 per cent of the shares (NST, 1994)[13]. Most
shares were still held by insiders – family members, friends, clan members and others
known personally to the companies’ founders. In the case of many privatised entities
including those listed at the KLSE, the shareholders were other government entities.
The Securities Commission (SC) was established in 1993 to streamline the
regulatory framework of the Malaysian capital market as well as enhance the
efficiency, professionalism and orderly development of both the securities and futures
industries[14]. Another additional measure taken in 1996 by the government was to
establish the Malaysian Accounting Standards Board[15]. Due to the proliferation of
white-collar crimes that had negatively affected shareholders and intense pressure
from the public for the directors and management in public companies to be
accountable for their activities, the KLSE in 1994 made it compulsory for all listed
companies to set up Audit Committees (Maelah, 1995).
However, the financial crisis in 1997 not only aggravated the weaknesses in the
NEP but also opened a Pandora’s box, revealing the strong collusion between the
ruling political group and business[16]. The strong nexus between politics and
business was further aggravated when the government tried to bail out ailing
companies owned by ethnic Malay moguls and those companies close to the ruling
party by using public funds, such as the Employees Provident Fund (EPF)
(Jayasankaran, 1998). In other words, even after a significant proportion of the
economy had been transferred under the so-called privatisation exercise from the
government to the private sector, needing what was proclaimed to be a strong
accounting profession, it appears that much of the private sector was still in the hands
of those closely associated with the government sector (Gomez, 1997; Jomo, 1995). This
section of the private sector may even be considered an “extension” of the government
sector, where reigning politicians and their political parties had for years been deeply
involved in the business sector (Leigh, 1992; Gale, 1985). There was merely a
superficial rearrangement of wealth and thus power among the few in society. The
crisis also exposed inadequacies, especially of companies listed on the Second Board of
the KLSE, in terms of management and weak cash flows, and in turn certainly reflected
weaknesses in the regulatory mechanism of both the SC and the KLSE. The apparent
overlap of functions between the SC and the ROC and the doubtful efficacy of the




The relaxing of public control (and the nexus of political-bureaucratic-business)
supported by the buoyant economy and high levels of foreign and domestic investment
resulted in the decline of the bureaucratic element and the growth of the political
element (McVey, 1992). These businesses often acted in collaboration with foreign
capital, which favoured the government’s liberalisation strategy. In other words,
privatisation “afforded new opportunities to the beneficiaries of the patrimonial
regime” (Ravenhill, 1995; preface). Therefore, where before growth was based on
expansionary public expenditure, from the late 1980s onward, most of the economic
growth was due to private sector activities – with the expected inevitable impacts on
the nation’s audit practices.
4.1 Audit in the Post-NEP era: the rejuvenating period
The economic recessions of the 1980s disrupted the pre-existing political, corporate and
financial systems in Malaysia and created a perceived need for “structural” (as opposed
to in-depth) changes to the auditing profession. The fact that changes in the audit
process stressed form more than substance had ensured that little could be expected
from the auditors and their representative accounting body, the MIA.
Auditing in the post-NEP era has been marked by the revival of the MIA after being in
a sedated state for two decades. Other parties, besides the Accountant General, culpable
for the sedation of the MIA during the period include MACPA and the government
(Ali, 2002). An active MIA, with its own examination and substantial membership
numbers compared to MACPA (which was and still is in the hands of the big audit firms),
meant more competition and a reduction in the domination of the audit market by the Big
Six. A strong accounting profession, dominated by the non-bumiputra controlled MIA
while the Malays were nowhere in economic terms, caused the government to take a
pragmatic approach by “neglecting” the profession during that period.
Interestingly, documentary evidence suggests that the government directed the
MIA to become active again in 1987 so that it could play the role of the national
accounting body, as envisaged by the Accountants Act 1967 (Berita Harian, 1988;
Akauntan Nasional, 1992a), as well as attract overseas capitalist entrepreneurs. Some
of the reasons documented include concern by the government of the status of the
accounting profession during the NEP era: the proliferation of unqualified accountants
had caused the government to incur colossal losses as a result of their falsification of
their clients’ accounts, as reflected in various financial scandals, which ultimately
resulted in a loss of confidence in the profession among both the general public and
foreign investors (MIA, 1988). Some of the goals set by the government for the newly
revived MIA include looking after professional standards, education and training,
supervising the professional conduct of members, providing professional work of the
highest standard in serving the various needs of the sophisticated business
community, as well as earning the trust and respect of society (The Malaysian
Accountant, 1987). In short, the formation of the Investigation and Disciplinary
Committee, comprising representatives from the Treasury, the ROC and the Registrar
of Cooperatives, after the inaugural AGM of the MIA in 1987 was intended to “clean
up” the image of the profession.
Despite the strong rhetoric of disciplining errant members in the early years of its
activation and the launch of its Code of Ethics in 1990, the MIA was deemed





cases investigated, under review or pending from its activation until a year before the
financial crisis.
Besides failure to take actions against errant members, the MIA also failed to
implement ideas that its leaders themselves claimed were needed to strengthen the
nation’s audit practice and accountability. Those ideas include the practice of quality
review of the audit firms, auditor independence and continuing professional
development (CPD) (Ali, 1999).
However, the MIA is more successful as a promoter of its members’ interests rather
than public interests, although it is not always positively regarded by either the
government or its members. In 1988, the MIA submitted a memorandum requesting
the government to look into the desirability and possible methods of limiting an
accountant’s personal liability for negligence claims, but the government ignored the
request. At the same time, in an all-out effort to protect its members’ public accounting
activities and fight against the unqualified/unregistered accountants, the MIA lodged
92 police reports and the police had raided 19 firms by the end of 1988 (NST, 1988a).
The MIA also hired lawyers to bring the matter to court. The crackdown activities
ended when the Malaysian Institute of Corporate Secretaries and Administrators
(MICSA), representing the unregistered accountants, sent a letter of appeal to the
government to review the drastic actions taken by the MIA (NST, 1988b). In 1992,
the MIA launched the Malaysian Association of Accounting Technicians (MAAT) to
represent most of those so-called accountants. If the MIA had done this earlier, it would
have obviated the need for a crackdown on the unregistered accountants.
In 1991, it launched a professional indemnity insurance scheme but failed to get a
good response from its practising members (Akauntan Nasional, 1992a; NST, 1991b).
In promoting the accounting profession, the MIA also proposed institutionalising its
minimum audit fees schedule to be effective from 1 January 1992 (Akauntan Nasional,
1992b), but this date was later moved to 1 April 1993 (Akauntan Nasional, 1993), and
ended up merely as a “guideline” as of 1 September 1994, following uproar from the
Associated Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry Malaysia (ACCCIM), the
Federation of Malaysian Manufacturers (FMM) plus a few other interested parties.
In terms of the education and training of accountants, the MIA only managed to set its
professional examination in 1996 in a combined effort with the Chartered Association
of Certified Accountants (CACA) (Akauntan Nasional, 1995), hence it did not actually
provide a real alternative or an additional avenue for locals wishing to qualify as
accountants prior to this time.
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In summary, although the MIA was revived in 1987, it was not expected to emerge as a
strong accounting body able to play the required role in confronting cases of
corruption, nepotism and patron-clientelism that had been plaguing the country for
many decades, particularly in the few years prior to the onset of the Asian Financial
Crisis in 1997. It was in the interest of certain sections of Malaysian society to see a
malfunctioning audit monitored by a relatively powerless professional accounting
body and weak enforcement of the company law section on auditor’s duties of
reporting to the ROC. Therefore, while the MIA council members appeared to be
ineffective and those overseeing the audit-related sections of the amended Companies
Act had failed to play their role, others with the power to make corrections had
not translated their words into actions. Thus, it may safely be said that the
debilitating atmosphere in the audit arena in the post-NEP era had been deliberate and
intended to deflect attention from creating a “local culture of accountability” and full
transparency, because interested parties did not want to face the unnecessary
“complication” of explaining themselves to anyone in their pursuit of gaining economic
ascendancy.
5. Summary and conclusions
This paper narrates the three episodes in the Malaysian audit saga, covering the period
of the first 40 years after independence in 1957. Based on documentary evidence, the
paper demonstrates that auditing in Malaysia is not simply a technical phenomenon but
one intertwined with the dynamics of the wider political and socio-economic context.
This supports the contention by Hopper et al. (1987) that accounting development has
been implicated in broader ideological and political struggles in society.
In the first episode, which covers the first decade after independence, auditing can
be seen to originate as a consequence of the perception of the nation’s leaders of the
importance of maintaining the status quo of the national economy and in fulfilling
the stewardship role for the benefit of Western investors. In the second episode,
following the launch of the NEP in 1971, the function of auditing in Malaysian society
was in most cases devoid of any essence of mission; instead, it was created, shaped and
changed by the pressures which gave rise to its development over time. The
importance of auditing for stewardship purposes became limited due to the ambiguity
of the principal-agent dichotomy in the majority of companies owned by the
government or its associates or by Malaysian Chinese. This was a consequence of
changes to the bureaucratic and command-economic system brought about by changes
in ethnic relations. In the third episode, covering the period from the abrupt end of the
NEP to the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis, the uncertain and unsatisfactory state of
the auditing profession was similar to that found in other Asian countries, such
as the Philippines (Dyball and Valcarcel, 1999) and Japan (Sakagami et al., 1999).
Despite the progress towards a global liberal market economy, the strong bond
between corporate elites and political leaders weakened the modern audit
infrastructure.
In short, the practice of auditing in Malaysia was merely to fulfil legal requirements
and provide an “image” of a modern economy to attract investments from overseas
rather than to address the needs of its own social environment. Ethnicity has been the
most readily identifiable social-structural characteristic in the Malaysian business





continues to be resisted. The changes that took place over the period analysed were
more ephemeral than real, structural rather than in-depth, and it would be interesting
to see the status of the profession and the extent of its role in the next episode of the
Malaysian auditing saga.
Notes
1. Malaysia has had a long history of colonization by Western foreign powers; the Portuguese
in 1511, the Dutch in 1641 and the British from 1786 until 1957 (Berita, 1992). Although the
Portuguese and Dutch came to the country for trading, it was British colonialism that left a
lasting effect in many aspects of the nation’s life, including its government, legal and
economic structures.
2. These publicly owned companies were managed by the merchant houses (Kennedy, 1993).
3. It was set up by twenty local accountants who were formerly members of the Malayan
branch of the Association of Chartered and Incorporated Accountants (ACIA) and the
Malayan branch of the Association of Certified and Corporate Accountants (ACCA).
4. The first three presidents of MACPA were Westerners, namely, D. Stewart (1958/59),
W.M. Piercy (1959 to 1961) and H.R. Villiers (1961/62) (MACPA, 1977).
5. The Singapore Society of Accountants Ordinance 1963 was based upon the New Zealand
Society of Accountants Act (Hai, 1971).
6. By the early 1970s, foreign ownership structure was as follows: in agriculture and fisheries,
it was as high as 75 per cent; in mining and quarrying, about 72 per cent; and in commerce
and manufacturing, it was 63 and 59 per cent, respectively, (Pillai, 1984).
7. The Malay bourgeoisie was strongly associated with statist capitalists, that is, those social
groups who control capital accumulation by virtue of their access to state power (Jomo,
1986).
8. The “Malaysian Incorporation” rallied public-private sector co-operation, and
disinvestments of some government agencies to private enterprise (privatisation)
consequently ensued.
9. This committee could only be formed by the MIA after an AGM. Unfortunately, since the
appointment of the then Accountant-General as the MIA’s president on 31 May 1968, not a
single AGM was conducted in the next two decades until the end of his leadership in April
1987. Hence, the right machinery for disciplining members was absent.
10. The number of unqualified accountants was estimated to be around 3,000, and including
those they employed, 15,000 (NST, 1988a). Most of the unqualified public accountants were
identified as coming from corporate secretarial and administrative firms (The Star, 1988).
11. In 1993, the MIA estimated that there were between 50 and 100 licensed accounting firms
collaborating with unqualified accountants (NST, 1993).
12. The appalling state of audit in this period may best be illustrated by the scandal involving
Bank Rakyat, which the government had to rescue in 1977 due to colossal losses. A
Parliamentary White Paper (1979) revealed widespread corrupt activities by parties inside
the bank and those related to it, including the external auditor, and yet the auditor appears to
have escaped without censure or penalty.
13. Such listed companies were labelled by the chairman of the Malaysian Institute of Economic
Research (MIER) as “private-owned public company” (NST, 1991a).
14. The agencies responsible for the regulation of the capital market before the establishment of
the SC include the ROC, CIC, TOP and FIC. Moreover, several other bodies also involved at




International Trade and Industry, Bank Negara Malaysia (central bank) and the Ministry of
Finance (Sharif, 1993).
15. It was set up aimed at ensuring a high level of financial reporting and disclosure in the
corporate sector; moving from merit-based to disclosure-based regulations for initial public
offerings, aimed at fostering a more competitive and transparent market as well as
inculcating higher standards of disclosure, due diligence, corporate governance and
accountability by companies; relaxing the track-record requirements for
Malaysian-incorporated or joint-venture infrastructure companies seeking listing;
approving securities borrowing and lending, regulating short selling and amending KLSE
Listing Requirements with a view to improve the regulatory framework and the
transparency of the market (Ministry of Finance, 1996; Haniffa, 1999).
16. The strong collusion between government and business is not only apparent in Malaysia but
also in other Asian countries. In fact, one criticism has been that the ruin of the Korean
economy was also due to government collusion with business and its control of financial
institutions (Biers et al., 1998).
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